Delegation of powers to United Nations subsidiary organs

Abstract: I have in this thesis set out to answer questions surrounding the delegation of powers to subsidiary organs of the UN. In the first chapter, there is an introduction on how the subsidiary organs are established, the rules and guidelines that have to be followed. These can be found in the UN Charter, articles 7 (2), 22, 29 and 68, and in the chapter on limitations I have a description on why I have decided to look at only the three first of these articles. In order to establish a subsidiary organ, the principal organ - the creator of the subsidiary - has to delegate a portion of its own powers to this organ. This is the task, which the subsidiary is set out to fulfil. In order for the principal to be able to delegate powers, it has to possess the power it is to delegate according to the principle of nemo dat quod non habet - what you do not have you cannot give away. The definition of a subsidiary organ has been a question without a clear answer in many of the books I have read on the topic, and this discussion is also one I have decided to look into in the first chapter. Since the subsidiary organs established by the principal organs of the UN are all different, I have included a description of the composition and functions of the subsidiary organs already established. In this chapter, there is also a description of a few subsidiary organs established by the SC and the GA respectively, and most important of all, a discussion around the implied powers doctrine, a doctrine used most frequently by the American Congress in its interpretation of the United States constitution. It is therefore disputed whether this doctrine can be used analogically in an international organisation such as the UN. This is a question, which the ICJ has ruled on in an advisory opinion, Reparation for Injuries case. In the following two chapters, Chapters 3 and 4, I have analyzed two subsidiary organs established by the SC, namely the Boundary Demarcation Commission, a part of the peace-agreement between Iraq and Kuwait after the first Gulf War, and also the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, ICTY. This is a subsidiary organ of the SC, which has actually decided its own competence in a judgment called the Tadic Case, a case which I have analyzed in chapter 4. These are both subsidiary organs who possess powers not expressly given to the SC by the UN Charter and hence important to the discussion of delegation of powers by principal organs of the UN. These two chapters are followed by my personal conclusions on the subject. A distinction has to be made between those powers set out expressly in the UN Charter, and those that can be implied by looking at the purposes and principles of the organisation. Since there in my opinion, and in the opinion of many of the scholars who I have studied over the past few months, exist implied powers in the UN Charter, the question becomes a much more complex one than it is at first glance. I have in my conclusions a discussion around this.