An Undisciplined Vice President: Explaining the behavior of the argentine Vice President in the 2008 farm conflict

Abstract: In March 2008 a conflict started in Argentina between the government and the farm sector due to the introduction of a new tax scheme on the exportation of grains. Turning into one of the biggest conflicts the country had seen in recent years, the President decided to send a tax proposition to the Congress in order to give further approval to the measure. Despite having the President the majority of the seats in both Chambers, the measure was rejected by the Chamber of Senators. The unusual of this event was that the voting, having ended in a tie, was ultimately decided by the Vice President who voted against the measure originated from the President. The purpose of this study was to elucidate why the Vice President voted as he did, analysing the possible determinants behind his action. Within the objective of studying the Vice President’s behaviour is that the theoretical framework of Institutional Rational Choice was used, arguing that institutions, regarded as norms, rules and strategies, constrain or guide the behaviour of rational actors. Taking into consideration these two concepts, institutions and the rational actor, is that an analysis was constructed. The findings in this study stress that the Vice President acted in order to satisfy his preference or goal of ending the conflict, a behaviour that was allowed or permitted by legal rules, as those regarded in the Constitution, and certain rules and norms governing the coalition the Vice President was in. These rules and norms allowed then a behaviour of divergence which the Vice President ultimately took.