The ghost of wars past

Abstract: Early warning systems are institutionalized hypothesis of an adversary’s behavior. Such systems are mere models of our bias perception, not the real world. At best they describe casual relationships and employ predictive validity within the cognitively constructed analogies of the systems constructor and operator. An analogy is an experience used to create a generalizing model of analysis where a current case is being approached through the knowledge on a historic case in order to support decision making. Depending on the selection of analogy the model of analysis differ effecting the decision derived thereof. The strategic early warning is therefore most vulnerable against its actors’ coercive experiences and subjectivity, rendering a system’s preciseness impossible. However in the absence of a critical academic discourse on the validity of early warning systems the oversimplified and bureaucratic approach to fact and prediction prevails in early warning communities and among decision makers. In this thesis I state propositions on a social constructivist critique of the overconfidence in early warning systems. I will illustrate how analogies and perceptions override decision makers’ objectivity and how early warning systems are misaimed in correspondence to the actors’ beliefs perceptions rather than the information presented.