Negotiating the Bra War: Analysing the interplay between the domestic, supranational and international level in the European Union

Abstract: Emanating from Putnam’s two-level game theory of international negotiations, the thesis analyse the interplay between the domestic, the supranational and the international level in the European Union, when negotiating the Bra War with China. The thesis expands Putnam’s theory into a three-level game theory in order to better understand the complexity of the European Union. The work concludes five main findings about how the Unions position during the Bra War should be understood and how the different levels in the negotiations have affected the outcome of the negotiations. First, the costs of a no-agreement will affect the likelihood of an agreement to be concluded. Second, the power relations, both between the levels and within the levels, in the European Union affect the outcome of the negotiations. Third, facing a heterogeneous constituency at the domestic level will not necessarily reduce the possibility of an agreement at the international level, the conclusion to be drawn from the Bra War negotiations points at the contrary. Fourth, the three-level structure of the European Union gives the interest groups more ways to exert influence. Fifth, the study shows that domestic and supranational politics cannot be studied independently from international politics.