The Economization of Migration

Abstract: Being acquainted with four of the most famous games in game theory, we will learn that players often are better paid off cooperating with each other, but that the structure of the game forces them to defect from cooperation. Only when confronted with the zero-sum game the players have no incentive to cooperate. In all the other games, cooperation is secured if the players commit themselves to adopting a cooperative strategy. However, if such a commitment should have any value it has to be credible, i.e. it has to make it impossible or too expensive for the player to take what normally would be her best action. In the discourse of human rights, we are often confronted with provisions of a highly moral nature. Many provisions are based on the assumption that States are moral agents. An equally valid assumption is that States in fact are self-regarding entities, preoccupied mainly with maximizing their own interests. The theories of organized hypocrisy and cherry picking helps explaining why these self-regarding entities called States sometimes do strengthen the protection for refugees. The theory of cherry picking says that a player may be willing to loose in the present round to get an even greater benefit in a coming one and organized hypocrisy is a notion used to explain the difference between the words and action of an organization. Hypocrisy is a way of balancing competing interests or to create an illusion that the interests of a specific group have been considered. Just as for the EU, one of the main puzzles of game theory is how to promote cooperation. The Open Method of Coordination and the European Refugee Fund are two initiatives made by the Union to promote a cooperative strategy among the Member States. While the ERF holds game theoretically valid properties to change the game, the properties of the OMC are less likely to foster cooperation. Given the fact that the European States are dependant on immigration in order for their economies to function, they cannot pursue a zero-immigration policy but have adopted a strategy I choose to call a ''need-based selection process''. This is a strategy aimed at letting the wanted in while keeping the unwanted out. The wanted is on the one hand highly skilled labour and on the other unskilled illegal workers. This selection process can take place in the country of destination or in the country of origin. Measures taken in the country of destination are often ineffective because of the fact that the potential asylum seeker's choice of destination is based on factors that are beyond the control of policy makers. This has led the EU to cooperate with migrant sending and transit countries. This form of cooperation has taken two forms&semic a control oriented externalization of migration control and a prevention oriented root cause approach. Neither of these strategies has lived up to their original expectations. A factor contributing to the failure of these strategies is one often neglected by the policy makers, namely that it is the perceived and not the actual payoffs that decide the strategy adopted by the player. Changes in the payoffs of the game thus have an impact on the game only if the other player is aware of these new payoffs. As a bystander with an intention to influence the game, it is easy to feel small and powerless. Game theory provides tools that help those wanting to have an impact on the game, even if they are not participating in it as players. The most important lesson to be learned from game theory is to use ones efforts on meaningful actions. This means e.g. that the common mistake of constantly attacking the players of the game for playing the game wrong should be replaced by a focus on the game itself and on how its payoffs can be shifted. One way of shifting the payoffs is to teach the players values, facts, knowledge and skills. Another way is to identify the different games played in the arena of migration. To reveal to a player how his counterpart simultaneously plays against another player in another game can change the game about. Thus, factors outside the game itself can be used to change the payoffs. Having a game theoretical approach to a problem means to constantly look for the strategy that in the end leads to the desired outcome. We often find ourselves stuck in traditional ways of thinking and acting, a fact that often results in an obstinate pursuance of a strategy that does not lead to the intended outcome. An alternative strategy in the context of refugee law could be the promotion of a common system for immigrants and asylum-seekers.