Of Moral Wizardry and Experiential Transformation : A Case for Consent as a Mental State

Abstract: In ethics, a highly relevant and divisive topic is that of consent. Many moral dilemmas and ethical forks in the road turn on the question of consent. But how do we differentiate between the consensual and the non-consensual? There is no simple answer to this question and philosophers are quite divided, as they tend to be. Some believe that consent is a mental state whereas others maintain that it is a behavioral expression of some kind. There are others still who argue that consent is some combination of mental states and communication. In this paper, I shall defend the view that consent is a mental state and that it does not depend on any type of behavior. My central thesis is that only this view accounts for the ethical importance of consent in a liberal moral framework where consent matters due to its connection to our intrinsic right to personal autonomy. Additionally, views that make consent dependent on behavior have counterintuitive, and sometimes morally unacceptable, consequences for what is and isn’t consensual. I argue that only the view that I defend can account for the moral significance that consent should have.