Essays about: "principal-agent problem"

Showing result 1 - 5 of 25 essays containing the words principal-agent problem.

1. 1. How do IPOs and SPACs differ in terms of post-listing performance, and how do insider and institutional ownership affect these differences?

   University essay from Göteborgs universitet/Graduate School

   Author : Markus Henriksson; Theodor Hansson; [2023-07-03]
   Keywords : SPACs; Special Purpose Acquisition Company; IPOs; Initial Public Offering; Ownership Structure; Abnormal Returns;

   Abstract : Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are the two most prevalent alternatives for firms seeking to list on the stock exchange, which we examine in this study. We study numerous parameters impacting the abnormal returns of IPOs and SPACs and, compare their performance in the short-term and long-term using regressions and current literature to explain the discrepancies. READ MORE

3. 2. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: An empirical study on the impact of managerial ownership & concentrated ownership on corporate performance of Swedish publicly traded firms

   University essay from Lunds universitet/Företagsekonomiska institutionen

   Author : Melker Melin; Ismailcan Korkmaz; [2022]
   Keywords : Agency costs; ROA; corporate governance mechanisms; corporate performance; Managerial ownership; Ownership concentration; Stewardship; Tobin s Q; Business and Economics;

   Abstract : Purpose The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms, managerial ownership, and concentrated ownership, on corporate performance in Swedish companies. With its distinguishing corporate governance regime and financial environment, Sweden facilitates a unique contribution to the ongoing discussion on ownership structure and agency conflicts. READ MORE

4. 3. The impact of institutional investors’ ownership on firm’s value and performance

   University essay from Lunds universitet/Nationalekonomiska institutionen

   Author : Phuong Thao Hoang; Markus Olsson; [2022]
   Keywords : Corporate governance; delegated monitoring; agency problem; institutional investors; shareholder value; Business and Economics;

   Abstract : Institutional investors and large investors play a crucial role as a governance mechanism to protect outsiders from excessive rent extraction by insiders. Where institutional investors can serve as a governance mechanism to intervene and discipline management, it also has several drawbacks and imperfections. READ MORE

5. 4. Effects of Endogenous Risks in Contract Design : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Optimal Contract Design in the Swedish Construction Industry

   University essay from KTH/Fastigheter och byggande

   Author : Julio Cesar De Barros Cruz; [2021]
   Keywords : Procurement contracts; Contract theory; Contract design; Principal agent; Asymmetric information; Optimal contract; Endogenous risk; Risk aversion; Incentive; Upphandlingskontrakt; Kontraktsteori; Kontraktsdesign; Principal agent; Asymmetrisk information; Optimalt kontrakt; Endogen risk; Riskaversion; Incitament;

   Abstract : The architecture, engineering and construction industry faces challenges when dealing withprocurement contract design and risk-handling. The optimal contracting practices have beenworldwide studied in areas of contract theory which studies how the optimal incentivemechanism (“contracts”) can be designed to encourage the parties to behave more efficiently. READ MORE

6. 5. Incentive models to improve the installation service of solar panels - a Case Study at E.ON New Solutions

   University essay from Lunds universitet/Teknisk logistik

   Author : Beata Gynnerstedt; Anneli Håkansson; [2021]
   Keywords : Incentive model; buyer-supplier-customer service triad; service contracting; incentives in contracts; Technology and Engineering;

   Abstract : Background The importance of services is increasing, and companies need well-developed service contracts to ensure the service providers perform at a satisfying level. In contracts, performance-dependent rewards (incentives) can be used to stimulate the agent to act desirably. This master thesis focuses on E. READ MORE