Safeguards of EU Integration? - An Analysis of the Impact of Article 7 TEU and Article 50 TEU on the European Integration Project

Abstract: There has been a surge in nationalism and populism in Europe. As these movements increasingly gain political influence in the Member States, the EU has been affected in several ways. This thesis will examine two of these instances: the alleged rule of law breaches in Poland and the probable fu-ture withdrawal of Britain from the EU. These situations are governed by Article 7 TEU and Article 50 TEU respectively, and their individual as well as mutual impact on the integration of the EU are therefore analysed. Are they capable of safeguarding the European integration project against national constitutional disruptions and populism? A better understanding of the theoretical and constitutional framework that shapes the EU will enable an analysis of the Articles that takes their legal and political context into account. The thesis begins with examining the constitutional foundation of the EU through its legal and political development. This shows that the integration project has expanded into covering not only its initial goal of economic integration through the internal market, but broader policy areas. For ex-ample, human rights are now entrenched in EU law through the enactment of the Charter and Article 2 TEU establishes the fundamental values in the EU. In relation to this, the centrality of the rule of law to the functioning of the EU and its integration project must be underlined. Moreover, the politi-cal and legal orders are evaluated from the perspective of theories of inter-governmentalism and supranationalism in order to determine the structure of the European integration. This illustrates an EU with a mix of both in-tergovernmental and supranational aspects in its structure and operations. It proceeds with an evaluation of the procedures under Article 7 TEU and Article 50 TEU. Article 7, which provides the EU with the power to sanc-tion a Member State in breach of the fundamental values in Article 2 TEU, show two major weaknesses. The first is its high thresholds. The second is the constitutional nature of the act allegedly in breach as well as the fact that its scope is extended to cover situations where the Member State has acted within its exclusive competence. The complementary procedures adopted as pre-Article 7 mechanism are different due to opposing under-standings of monitoring powers over Member States. This backwards de-velopment shows an increased focus on intergovernmental governance in the EU. Article 50, which allows for the unilateral withdrawal of a Member State from the EU, further underlines this. However, after an examination of its terms in respect of the negotiations and subsequent withdrawal agreement, it appears to be shaped to the EU’s advantage. It can therefore be concluded that it incorporates supranational and federal aspects in its structure and operations. Furthermore, the thesis shows that these Articles, and their effects, are in-terlinked to a certain extent. This is due to their impact on the power rela-tion between the Member States and the EU in terms of national sovereign-ty and the conferral of competences. Lastly, it is analysed whether Article 7 TEU and Article 50 TEU can safe-guard the European integration. Article 7 TEU, although theoretically equipped with tools to safeguard compliance with the fundamental values in Article 2 TEU, these are not effectively utilised because of the intergov-ernmental and political aspects of its structure. This is problematic, as compliance with the fundamental values in Article 2 TEU are essential to uphold the functioning of the EU. However, it is equally important that the Member States remain in the EU. Although providing for the unilateral withdrawal from the EU, Article 50 TEU has proven to be more than a purely intergovernmental tool for disintegration. Firstly, it is supranational in its operations. Secondly, it can further integration through allowing a let-out for Member States that do not want to cooperate. Combined, these as-pects show the inefficiency of increased intergovernmental governance and the importance of an open discussion of the constitutional basis on which the European integration should be carried forward.