Personal Autonomy and the Ideal Self

Abstract: Contrary to what often is implied I believe that autonomous action does not have to be morally or rationally justifiable or performed from volitions that are conscious to the agent. If we are to analyze personal autonomy it follows from the above that we need a supplementary concept to include actions that are based on unconscious or preconscious desires as well as non-moral values as possible contenders for autonomous action. I will suggest that the Ideal Self that build on models of hierarchy, planning and coherence provides this supplementary concept as well as providing a stronger case to the objections of regress and authority normally associated with hierarchic models. If is generally recognised that a theory of personal autonomy needs to explain why a manipulated person is not autonomous but I will argue that manipulation and external forces such as coercion is in fact not a threat to autonomy. Finally I will argue that authenticity and moral conduct are to be considered concepts separated from autonomous action.