More harm than good? : Exploring the effects of targeted sanctions on rebel groups' violence against civilians

Abstract: Targeted sanctions have become a commonly used conflict management tool over the last decades. Yet, operating in the state-centric context, previous research has highlighted the unintended negative effects of the instrument. What remains understudied is the effects of targeted sanctions on rebel groups' behavior. Acknowledging that sanctions are never imposed in isolation, this thesis seeks to explore the effects of targeted sanctions on rebel groups' violence against civilians and how the presence of peacekeeping influences this. This thesis argues that targeted sanctions increase a rebel group's violence against civilians through the mechanism of constrained resources and decreased capabilities to provide selective incentives to its fighters. Peacekeeping counter this mechanism by acting as a physical barrier between the combatants and the civilians, ultimately altering the cost-benefit analysis. UNITA in Angola and RUF in Sierra Leone are examined using a within-case and an across-case comparison. The findings lend mixed support to the notion that targeted sanctions increase a rebel group's violence against civilians. However, the results support the second hypothesis; peacekeeping appears to counterbalance the adverse effects of targeted sanctions on rebel groups' violence against civilians.