Undermining Derk Pereboom’s Hard Incompatibilist Position Against Agent-causation : A Metatheoretical Work on the Topic of Metaphysics and Metaethics

Abstract: The author has attempted a dubbleedged purpose, as indicated by the title. The author firstly deals with Pereboom; begining with his so-called ‘wild coincidence’-argument, by which Pereboom claims agent-causation to be unlikely. The author argues that this argument lacks both scope and strenght. The author then deals with the question of compatiblity between physics and agent-causation as related to Pereboom’s basic problematization; whether agent-causation would or would not diverge from what is expected (from any other event) given our best physical theories. This results in a strong criticism against Pereboom’s whole position, and a positive argument for agent-causation. After the first purpose is achieved, the author turns to the purpose indicated by the subtitle. The author presents a general criticism against the field of metaethics concerning the question of free will. The author also makes suggestions for a possible solution.