Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Public and Unilateral Dispute Settlement : A redefinition of the autonomy of disputing parties and arbitral tribunals in the process of investment treaty arbitration

Abstract: Over the last decade, investment treaty arbitration has been confronted with relatively extensive and fundamental criticisms. The problem with the system in fact boils down to a misconception by tribunals of the nature of investment treaty arbitration. Many scholars and tribunals have perceived and treated investment treaty arbitration as a reciprocal arrangement with a private function. This is so mainly because of the way they formulate the establishment of investment treaty arbitration. To put it simply, it has been though that investment treaty arbitration, similar to international commercial arbitration, is founded upon a reciprocal contract made through a merger of intentions of the host State and the foreign investor. This perception would necessarily lead to the application of the principle of party autonomy as the main governing principle over the process of arbitration; a principle that is well tailored to adjudications with private function. Contrary to this, a careful examination of the nature of investment treaty arbitration reveals not only the public dimensions of the system, but also the unilaterality of the framework on which the system stands. These two characteristics require a shift in paradigm; otherwise, the system will expose to more and more legitimacy crises. The present research, therefore, tends to make a clear distinction between the two systems of international commercial and investment treaty arbitration, and explore the implications of this paradigm-shifting for the process of investment treaty arbitration, in particular, the way tribunals interpret the instrument of consent and the autonomy of tribunals in the course of the arbitration.