Description and analysis of Institutions for Communal Forest Management in Monte Verde, Bolivia.

Abstract: This study contributes to the Common Pool Resources debate by describing and analysinginstitutions that currently structure governance of community-based forest management inSanta Mónica and Palestina, within the Monte Verde region, Bolivia. It explores theinterplay between innovative communal and central-authority institutional features, theway they work and how they enable forest conservation. The method is narratology andanalysis of institutions and documents produced by this governance system through thelens of Elinor Ostrom’s institutional framework for the ‘alternative solution’ to thecommons problem. The results reveal that local communal rules and central-authorityrules are complementary rather than competitive. The local communities and the centralauthorityshare power to devise and enforce institutions for communal forestmanagement, which enable the local communities to exclude external actors, known as‘timber pirates’, who illegally harvest timber in this region. The central-authorityestablishes guidelines that are sensitive to local cultural contexts. Local governancedevelops rules conforming to these guidelines. The main reasons behind successful forestconservation in Monte Verde lie on the fact that a healthy forest is in the interest of localcommunities due to its contribution to economic development. Ecosystem services suchas traditional forest produce, profits from timber sales and related employment are vitalcontributors to the local economy. Governmental institutions and internationalconservation principles support this local interest and, therefore, this collaborative relationis successful. This case study also explores an innovative approach for dealing with theproblem of free-riding. Collective appropriation of timber products by local communitiesprevents internal individual appropriation race and enables them to make a more effectivemonitoring over unauthorised forest users.