Solving the Collective Action Problem - A Comparative Study of the Climate and Trade Policy Processes

Abstract: It is the purpose of this essay to compare the trade policy process with the climate policy process within a collective action framework in order to determine differences and similarities. With the recognition that the trade process has been more successful in mitigating the Prisoner’s Dilemma this comparison provides lessons for the climate process. The study is conducted through an analysis of how the processes compare with respect to iterated games, group size, monitoring and compliance and finds that some significant differences exist. The differences can be said to embody two different approaches to international governance. The trade process, on the one hand, can be characterised by a building blocks approach where a non-comprehensive agreement has evolved into an effective international organisation. The climate process, on the other hand, is characterised by a grand bargain where a comprehensive single undertaking approach has been unsuccessfully attempted, thus leading to a breakdown of trust and an ineffective regime. The lesson is thus to rethink the climate process and attempt a building blocks approach to solve the collective action problem.