Governmental power sharing: imperative? : A comparative case study on decentralization and its influence on public support for secessionism

Abstract: Scholarly debates about the merits of decentralization have long been central in comparative politics. However, there is a lack of consensus in the existing literature on its relationship with secessionism, and previous scholarship on autonomy and power sharing suffers from several shortcomings that make it difficult to evaluate the influence of decentralization on secessionist conflict. To address this research gap, a new theoretical framework is proposed which suggests inclusion for regional elites within the state’s national decision-making institutions is imperative for the prevention against secessionism in established democracies. Utilizing an innovative comparative process tracing method, a theory-driven within-case empirical analysis and between-case comparison is conducted between Spain and Catalonia, and the United Kingdom and Scotland. The findings illustrate that decentralization with a higher degree of governmental power sharing (shared rule) is associated with a lower degree of public support for secessionism, and this association is produced through a social mechanism of power.