A possible defense of philosophical anarchism : An examination of whether A. John Simmons' philosophical anarchism can withstand Luara Ferracioli's counterargument

Abstract: The philosopher A. John Simmons has early on put forward a defense for philosophical anarchism. He believes that he has succeeded to establish that the different non-voluntaristic attempts to explain state legitimacy all fail to give a solid explanation of how states can be legitimate without expressed consent. In the light of the huge problems to establish legitimacy on pure voluntaristic grounds he concludes that it there might not exist any legitimate states. In the reality of this, he believes philosophical anarchism must be considered as a possible theory in political thought.An important notion in Simmons’ philosophical anarchism is to distinguish between legitimacy and justification. In the Kantian understanding of justification, it entails legitimacy. This is not so in the Lockean way of thinking, according to Simmons. This distinction is crucial for understanding Simmons’ version of philosophical anarchism where one could endorse and regard a state as justified without having to admit that it is legitimate.Luara Ferracioli has tried a slightly different approach and has argued for that there is a contradiction within philosophical anarchism. She has tried to show that a liberal state is the only guaranty to safeguard the autonomy of children. This creates a conflict for the anarchist where both the endorsement and the disproval of the state renders the anarchist to deny a group autonomy (children or adults).In the end, I argue for that Simmons’ philosophical anarchism survives this attack by maintaining his weaker form of philosophical anarchism and sticking to his distinction between justification and legitimacy of the state. The downside of his theory, however, seems to be that we are left with a rather lukewarm theory that may not change much in practice.