Sentient Objects — A Theoretical Analysis of the Potential of Animals as Legal Subjects

Abstract: The sentience of animals has been scientifically proven since the nineteenth century, which has led to changes in our attitude towards animals and to the proliferation of anti-cruelty laws. But despite the rise of an Animal Law discipline, animal rights organisations’ attempting to elevate the legal status of animals, and several recent European legislative changes categorising animals as “non-things”, the legal status of a person has not yet been extended to animals. They remain, one could say, as sentient objects. This essay consists of testing the thesis that the legal subject should be extended to animals, by utilising legal theory to examine both the probability and the suitability of such a change. The current legal status of animals is assessed through examining western animal protection legislation and various studies that demonstrate a lack of conformity with existing animal laws. Furthermore, the traditional conception of legal personality and the person–thing dichotomy is investigated. Along with this, theories on rights and the relation between rights and the legal subject is discussed. Moreover, the essay employs several legal theories and perspectives when examining existing criticism of the traditional conception on legal personhood, when considering the reasons against a “direct” legal personification of animals, and when exploring alternative perspectives. Additionally, a semiotically inspired method is utilised to analyse the potential of the legal personhood of animals and of the limits of the person–thing dichotomy, to discuss the implications of current and alternative views on legal personhood and to further examine the transformation and limits of the legal subject. The conclusion drawn is that a direct legal personification of animals would not meet either the requirement of probability or that of suitability. However, the essay concludes that the alternative of an indirect legal personification — meaning that only certain parts of the legal subject is extended to animals — would be a way of moving towards a better protection of animals in a more realistic and better suited way. The conclusion is that moving away from the current traditional perspective and the person–thing dichotomy in this way would result in granting animals a new legal status better suited for them and their properties.