The International Negotiation Practices of the European External Action Service

Abstract: Putnam’s seminal work on two-level game theory has been used widely in international negotiation research. The European Union is often argued to be a tough negotiating partner and its complex system of preferences poses a challenge to many of the fundamental assumptions of the two-level game model. The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2011 introduced another core stakeholder in EU negotiations which remains an under-researched area. This thesis proposes an alternative approach to the research of EU international negotiations based on the two-level game model: the integration of practice theory. The recent ‘practice turn’ in social sciences provides a unique theoretical and methodological approach to the investigation of international phenomena. It is based on the premise that world affairs are enacted through the performance of daily practices by human actors. This thesis thus combines two-level game theory and practice theory in order to describe the practices of the EEAS during the negotiation of the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement. In terms of methodology, the objective is to gain empirical insight in the performance of practices which necessitated data acquisition from semi-structured qualitative interviews and text based primary sources. The data is subsequently interpreted through the combined perspective of the two-level game model and the core concepts of practice theory. The findings demonstrate that the practices of the EEAS were crucial in the negotiation of the PDCA. The practice-based analysis also suggests that practices render preferences dynamic which may relax the assumption of the EU being a tough negotiating partner. Finally, it is concluded that despite the methodological limitations, practice theory promises valuable perspectives for the implementation of the two-level game model.