The Repugnant Conclusion and intuitions about large number cases

Abstract: In this essay I consider whether it is possible to defend Utilitarianism against The Repugnant Conclusion by questioning the reliability of our intuitions about large number cases. The first part deals with a proposal by John Broome. Broome claims that our “homely intuitions” should be set aside in large number cases, just as our intuitions for building bridges should be set aside when spanning broad rivers. Instead of intuitions, we should rely on theory in these cases. I discuss Broome’s claims and consider some objections. In the end of the first part, I suggest that Broome might have a difficult time defending Total Utilitarianism against Repugnant Conclusions involving smaller numbers. The second part considers a recent proposal by Johan E. Gustafsson. Gustafsson claims that it is not large numbers per se, but rather extreme trade-offs which causes problems for our intuitions’ reliability. This enables him to avoid small number-Repugnant Conclusions. However, as I argue, Gustafsson faces other challenges. Most notably, he seems required to explain the observed systematicity of our intuitive judgements. But on at least one version of The Repugnant Conclusion this seems difficult. I conclude that Large Number Sceptics have not yet proposed an explanation that successfully defends Utilitarianism against The Repugnant Conclusion.