Political Trust and Economic Inequality - An examination of political trust and economic inequality in 29 European countries

Abstract: This study investigates the relationship between political trust and income inequality in 29 European countries, using Easton’s (1975) trust-as-evaluation approach. The theoretical basis consists of Easton (1975) and Rothstein’s (2011)Low Trust-Corruption-Inequality trap theory. Political trust is operationalized through, trust in parliament, legal system, and police, whilst economic inequality is operationalized as Gini coefficient and unemployment in the labor force. The study uses a fixed effects model, after a Hausman test is run. The model has two iterations, a standard model and an expanded model which includes regional division and controls for Rothstein’s notion that universal social programs promote political trust. It is concluded that economic inequality has a conflicting effect on political trust, positive for Gini and negative for unemployment in the labor force. This follows the results in the literature at large, moreover, there is some evidence in favour of the idea that universal social programs promote political trust. However, the results are not clear, but rather conflicting. As such the study opens for further research into the effect of economic inequality, universal social programs, and for expanded models which include cross-continental data.