How much is (not) enough? : A Study of the Effect of Power-sharing Provisions on post-treaty Conflict-Related Sexual Violence by Rebel Groups in sub-Sahara Africa

Abstract: This thesis studies why some non-state armed groups commit high levels of post-treaty conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) while others do not. The presented mechanism suggests that limited power-sharing provisions in a peace accord provide few incentives for group leaders to stay committed to the peace process. Thus, they strategically order or accept CRSV as a substitute form of violence. The aim is to be granted more concessions by their opponent in prospective renegotiations. This leads to high levels of post-treaty CRSV. This study first hypothesizes that post-treaty CRSV will be high when leaders have few incentives due to limited power-sharing. Secondly, it hypothesizes that, particularly, limited political power-sharing leads to a high level of post-treaty CRSV. By applying a structured focussed comparison, the hypotheses are tested on the cases of the MLC in the DRC, the Burundian Palipehutu-FNL, and the CNDD-FDD. The results show mixed support: extensive power-sharing was followed by low levels of CRSV, the same applies to political power-sharing. The findings for limited provisions were not as expected. This shows that the extensiveness of power-sharing provisions alone cannot explain the variation of post-treaty CRSV. Future research is needed to find additional causal factors.