Reviewing the Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgment

Abstract: The dual-process theory of moral judgment by Joshua Greene has influenced much of contemporary research on moral cognition. The dual-process research paradigm can be argued to have yielded fruitful results. The results in general often indicate a dichotomy between reasoning and emotional mechanisms. These results are interpreted in the existing theoretical framework as producing specific differentiations in moral judgment among test subjects. The experimental conditions expose subjects to moral dilemmas during functional brain scanning. A competitive interaction between dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex has been identified to affect subjects’ response. During more recent years, critique aimed at the dual-process theory that falls into three main categories has been raised against this paradigm. These problems may have negative effects on the results derived from the dual-process paradigm. In this essay I will review problems within the framework of the dual-process theory that concern terminology, where concepts tied to normative ethics, can be misleading. Researchers have also identified methodological problems that are proposed to create extraneous emotional variables unaccounted for in the dual-process theory. I compare results and proposals from initial studies with the critique and go through normative issues concerning what ethical conclusions neuroscientific data derived from dual-process paradigm could give. My conclusion is that the dual-process theory is a functional descriptive theory that needs to redefine its concepts, multiply emotional spectrum analysis and divide itself from normative claims.