Does the deferred payment method of Art. 5 ATAD provide for a technique proportionate to mitigate liquidity disadvantages of exit taxes?

Abstract: This thesis analyses the deferred payment method of Art. 5 para. 2 ATAD. It asks whether or not it is proportionate to mitigate liquidity disadvantages stemming from exit taxes. Such disadvantages are a general pattern of the Court of Justices case law on exit taxation. The analysis is therefore based on that respective case law. The thesis examines the roots of the deferred payment method, elaborates on the relevant domestic legislation with its preparatory works underlying the referred cases and shows, how it resulted in a directive aiming at tackling tax avoidance. It highlights the different objectives given in the case law on the one hand and the ATAD on the other hand. It assesses that the currently enacted five-year period for a payment in instalments is random. A comparative analysis will consider the economic outcomes of the current mechanism. This economic perspective provides the basis for a review of the challenges that have risen from an unreflective implementation of the case law. It was neither intended nor feasible to be directly applied for the objective of anti-tax avoidance. Ultimately, a proposal for an alternative solution is presented. This alternative is less restrictive and equally efficient. Thus, it proves that the current mechanism is disproportionate. Art. 5 para. 2 ATAD in its current design does not mitigate the liquidity disadvantages of exit taxes in a way that is in line with the EU fundamental freedoms and the objectives pursued.