Illegal rovdjursjakt : en rättsekonomisk analys av rovdjursproblematiken i Sverige

Abstract: In this essay a model of a potential illegal hunter's decision-making is created and presented in order to provide an overview of important parts of the complexities associated with the current Swedish predator policy. A comparison is made between a livestock owner's economic incentives, and the expected costs faced by the potentially caught lawbreaker. In accordance with economic theory the benefits and costs of illegal hunting are compared and thus the optimal choice is determined where marginal costs and benefits are equal. The model has been tied to reality through identification and discussion of the estimates the parameters of the model are likely to adopt. In cases where the estimates have shown to be too complicated to approximate, the discussion has been limited to cover what information should be needed to connect theory with reality. The effects of different policy instruments of the illegal hunting of predators are analyzed using the model. Current policy instruments such as, compensation and prevention of damages caused by predators are presented and discussed. Additionally, outcomes of an alternative property rights system are considered. The starting point for an alternative property rights system has in accordance with an idea proposed by Sellenthin & Skogh (2001) been that current predator policy could be replaced by a property rights regime. The replacement would imply that current compensation for damages caused by predators would be replaced by a compensation for conservation of endangered predators. A theoretical interpretation of the proposed idea is presented by the hypothetical construction of a livestock owner's utility function. The utility function includes an expression that enables the livestock owner to increase his/her own utility through conservation of predators. Given that conservation together with livestock farming generates economic benefits it is believed that the positive attitude towards predators would increase. That in turn could decrease illegal hunting. Finally a principle is presented, explaining how authorities should allocate their scarce resources to create incentives in order to discourage illegal hunting of predators. The interpretation of the principle is that each increase in the number of units conserved predators should be equal to each spent dollar, for each and every one of the policy parameters.