Intention and Indiscernibilia: : Against Interpretive Intentionalism

Abstract: What determines the meaning of a work of art? This paper considers three theories of art-critical interpretation: moderate actual intentionalism (the artist’s intention partly determines the work’s meaning), hypothetical intentionalism (the work’s meaning is the best hypothesis of what the artist could have meant), and the value-maximizing theory (interpretations which maximize the work’s value are to be preferred). I argue that moderate actual intentionalism is incoherent, collapsing either into the intentional fallacy or into an extreme form of intentionalism. I argue further that hypothetical intentionalism is premised on a distinction between two orders of intention which cannot be maintained, and, trades on a mischaracterization of the force of hypothetical intentions. I argue for the value-maximizing theory, which I claim provides an elegant interpretive framework while being theoretically untroubled vis-à-vis its competitors.