Oderint, dum metuant - The impact external authoritative actors may have had on the negotiations of Dayton and Rambouillet

Abstract: In this thesis, a theory testing research of two comparative cases has been conducted. By applying the Rational Choice inspired theory by Adam Przeworski, upon the two cases of the negotiations revolving around the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the war between Serbia and Kosovo, it has been examined whether the theory can be used to explain the difference in outcome. The essence of the theory is that belligerents will only comply with compromises in a negotiation situation, if there is an external actor with great authority, supervising the negotiations. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Accord was signed under supervision by NATO and the United States, putting an end to the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This negotiation is used as a comparative case in the attempt to isolate the main factors that contributed to the fact that the Rambouillet Peace Accord failed to be signed by both belligerents. The two contributing factors isolated in this research after the theory had passed the scrutiny, were the lack of ability to envision a mutual gain of a compromise, by the negotiating actors in the case of Rambouillet, and the dilution of the NATO military threat, thereby diminishing the external actor’s authority.