On some alleged solutions to the wrong kind of reasons problem

Abstract: According to the ‘fitting attitudes’ (FA) analysis of value, x is good means
that a pro-attitude towards x is fitting. A recent version of the analysis
is T. M. Scanlon’s (1998) ‘buck-passing’ account of value,
which suggests that an object is good or valuable if it has properties that
provide reasons for pro-attitudes towards the object. The ‘wrong kind of
reasons’ problem is an objection towards the account, acknowledging that
there are situations when these conditions are satisfied, but we are not
willing to consider the object as valuable. In this paper I will first
briefly review and criticize two solutions to the problem, by Parfit (2001)
and Skorupski (forthcoming), before moving on to my main point. I will then
examine in detail a very recent proposal offered by Danielsson and Olson
(2007), suggesting that value should be explained in terms of the notion
of ‘correctness’. I argue that their approach has some serious
disadvantages, and my contention is that the proposal is built on too loose
grounds to be a plausible defence of the buck-passing account of value. My
line of argument not only has implications for their definition of value,
but also on how we are to assess the FA analysis as a whole.