Action without Vision? : An Investigation on whether Frequency of Mandatory Financial Reporting affects Managment Focus on Long-term Growth

Abstract: This thesis aims to investigate whether frequency of mandatory financial reporting affects management focus on long-term growth. Evidence from the market has illustrated how managers within listed firms sometimes strive to meet market expectations on the latest reported earnings regardless of long-term consequences (see for example Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005; Grinyer, Russell & Collison, 1998). Yet, the existing literature has neglected to research market pressure in terms of financial reporting frequency and its proposed influence on long-term growth. This study seeks to find if a more frequent mandatory reporting affects managers to more often sacrifice long-term growth in terms of reduced R&D investments. By comparing six different stock exchanges with different interim reporting requirements, this study empirically examines the hypothesized relationship, using a robust multiple regression analysis based on 320 observations during the sample period 2008-2012. The statistically significant results show a negative correlation, suggesting that firms that are required to disclose quarterly reports invest less in R&D than firms that are only required to disclose semi-annual reports. A negative correlation is observed for the whole sample as well as for the five sectors individually. The results provide additional empirical evidence to the research fields of financial reporting, managerial myopia and earnings management.