Most Favoured Nation clauses and online platforms: competitive effects and EU competition law

Abstract: Most Favoured Nation clauses are often incorporated into agreements between online platforms and suppliers. These MFN clauses entail that the prices that are set by suppliers on these platforms, are not higher than the prices on other platforms or the suppliers’ own websites. In this thesis it will be discussed what the competitive effects of MFN clauses are and how they should be assessed under EU competition law. National Competition Authorities within the EU have assessed these clauses in different ways and there is a no clear guidance from the Commission on how to assess MFN clauses under EU competition law. It will be argued that the application of article 102 TFEU regarding the abuse of a dominant position would be the best suitable option. Furthermore, it will be argued that it is necessary that the Commission provides more guidance to end the situation of a differentiating approach within the European Union.