Does the support of Taiwan by the U.S. provide sufficient deterrence to prevent a Chinese invasion? A predictive study on the future of Taiwan

Abstract: The 2023 invasion of Ukraine by Russia has cast new light on the tense situation in East Asia between China and Taiwan, the latter supported by the U.S. The potential for conflict between the two great powers China and the U.S. has elevated the conflict over Taiwan to the forefront of international relations. This study aims to use deterrence theory, with an emphasis on conventional deterrence, as a foundation for an analysis of Taiwan’s future based on past, present and future capabilities militarily and economically between the two sides. I argue that China can be deterred, and Taiwan’s independence preserved, as long as sufficient deterrence is provided. The study also examines the continued relative absence of deterrence theory, particularly conventional deterrence, in IR and argues for its continued relevancy. Finally, I aim to present some of the most important work by John J. Mearsheimer, including from his seminal book “Conventional Deterrence” (1985), and to argue for how and why Mearsheimer’s narrow focus rooted in realism is problematic for a full understanding of deterrence theory as well as underlying aspects of international relations.