Evaluation of Cyber-Attacks in Networked Control Systems

Abstract: Networked Control Systems (NCS) form an essential role in numerous critical infrastructures, including water distribution plants, water treatment plants, electric power grids, and power transmission networks. NCS employ a communication network to share data between the plant and the controller. However, these networks are highly susceptible to cyber-attacks that can result in severe consequences. Previous studies on NCS have primarily focused on simulations and wired network setup which may not accurately represent NCS since they rely heavily on wireless communication. In this study, we first develop a practical setup which emulates an NCS. Secondly, using this setup, we study the robustness of LQR and H¥ controllers to cyber-attacks. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of a bound detector against various cyber attacks. We mainly focus on two types of cyber-attacks in this thesis: replay attacks and false-data injection attacks. The results indicate that while LQR and H¥ controllers remain stable during these attacks, the bound detector proves most effective against non-stealthy false-data injection attempts but less so when facing stealthy false-data injection and replay assaults. The thesis concludes by highlighting its limitations on practical NCS setup design and controller design, while also offering suggestions for future work aimed at addressing them.