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Found 3 essays matching the above criteria.

  1. 1. A simulation study of two combinatorial auctions

    University essay from Lunds universitet/Nationalekonomiska institutionen

    Author : David Nordström; [2012]
    Keywords : PD auction; UCE auction; Combinatorial auction; Ascending auction; VCG payments; Strategy-proof; Primal-dual algorithm; Business and Economics;

    Abstract : Combinatorial auctions allow buyers to express preferences over bun- dles of items. The Primal-Dual (PD) auction developed by de Vries et al. (2007) is an efficient ascending combinatorial auction which, given certain conditions on buyers valuations, achieves Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments. READ MORE

  3. 2. An Introduction to Fair and Non-Manipulable Allocations of Indivisible Objects

    University essay from Lunds universitet/Nationalekonomiska institutionen

    Author : Jens Gudmundsson; [2009]
    Keywords : indivisible objects; fairness; coalitionally strategy-proofness; auctions; Economics; econometrics; economic theory; economic systems; economic policy; Nationalekonomi; ekonometri; ekonomisk teori; ekonomiska system; ekonomisk politik; Business and Economics;

    Abstract : This paper analyzes a way of allocating primarily three indivisible objects to the same number of individuals. We define an allocation rule that, given the preferences of the individuals, distributes an amount of money together with exactly one indivisible object to each of the individuals in a fair and optimal way. READ MORE

  4. 3. On the Strategy-proof Social Choice of Fixed-sized Subsets

    University essay from Lunds universitet/Nationalekonomiska institutionen

    Author : Alexander Johannes Reffgen; [2006]
    Keywords : Strategy-proofness; Multi-valuedness; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; Linked domains; Partial preference relations; Economics; econometrics; economic theory; economic systems; economic policy; Nationalekonomi; ekonometri; ekonomisk teori; ekonomiska system; ekonomisk politik; Business and Economics;

    Abstract : This thesis gives a contribution to strategy-proof social choice theory, in which one investigates to what extent there exist voting procedures that never can be manipulated in the sense that some voter by misrepresentation of his preferences can change the outcome of the voting and obtain an alternative he prefers to that honest voting would give. When exactly one element should be elected from a set of at least three alternatives, then the fundamental result in strategy-proof social choice theory, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, shows that there in general exists no satisfactory non-manipulable voting procedure. READ MORE